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Abstract We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational
contenders that features three of the main rationalist explanations for armed con-
flicts: uncertainty, commitment, and indivisibility. Two parties play a Markov game
that combines stages of bargaining, where offers are made, with claim stages, where
one side can commit to impose surrender on the other. Under uncertainty on the per-
sistence of claims, long confrontations occur in the unique equilibrium of the game:
war arises when reality disappoints initial (rational) optimism, and it persists when
both agents are optimists but reality proves both wrong. Bargaining proposals that are
rejected initially might eventually be accepted after several periods of confrontation.
We provide an explicit computation of the equilibrium, evaluating the probability of
war, and its expected losses as a function of (i) the costs of confrontation, (ii) the
asymmetry of the split imposed under surrender, and (iii) the strengths of contenders
at attack and defense. Changes in these parameters display non-monotonic effects.
Keywords Bargaining · Incomplete information · Commitment · Indivisibilities ·
War
JEL Classification C78 · D74
1 Introduction
We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders. We focus
on the frictions and impasses that take place during this type of disputes. On the one
C. Ponsati
Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica-CSIC, 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain
e-mail: clara.ponsati@iae.csic.es
S. Sanchez-Pages (B)
University of Barcelona and University of Edinburgh, Avda Diagonal 690, Barcelona 08034, Spain
e-mail: sanchez-pages@ub.edu
123
158 SERIEs (2012) 3:157–179
hand, countries often bargain under uncertainty because strength and power are hard
to measure and prone to misrepresentation. On the other hand, wars are characterized
by alternating periods of negotiation and hostilities in which parties fight, obtain or
lose advantage, bargain and make demands to their opponents. These demands tend
in addition to be very persistent. One reason for this is that countries sometimes fight
over sacred places or symbolic enclaves over which concessions seem unacceptable.
In other occasions, even if a wide range of concessions are feasible, countries commit
to specific claims, due either to domestic political considerations or because claims can
grant them strategic advantage. All these frictions often make countries reluctant to
withdraw unreasonable claims and refuse bargaining until a protracted confrontation
persuades them to do otherwise.
We build up a model that focuses on these distinctive features of war and that com-
bines three of the main rationalist explanations for it: uncertainty, commitment and
indivisibility. We consider a set-up in which two parties must resolve a dispute that
could potentially go on for ever. The existence of phases of negotiation and fighting is
modelled as a multi-stage Markov game where over time players may find themselves
in a bargaining state, where one party makes a proposal and its acceptance by the
other party ends the game, or in a claim state, where bargaining is suspended and one
of the parties is in the position of making a demand biased to her benefit. At that point,
the game can terminate only if the opponent surrenders to such claim. Claims can only
be reversed when the side that makes it is defeated in confrontation.
Claim states constitute one of the main innovations of our model so let us elabo-
rate on their nature in more detail. Claims entail a specific division of the cake that
can stem from (1) parties commitment or (2) from the nature of the issue. One of
the main sources of commitment to specific demands is that contenders are actu-
ally non-unitary agents. Countries often raise claims thanks to the efforts of radical
groups and because assessors feed only positive news to leaders who in turn tend to
ignore negative information due to nationalism or patriotism.1 These biases difficult
negotiations by narrowing down the set of possible agreements. Military operations
such as troop movements and occupation of territories constitute another source of
commitment because they trigger honor and reputational considerations. On the one
hand, armies are trained to defend national honor, that is, to sustain commitment to
claims—even when they are hopeless—regardless of the cost, and to maintain a rep-
utation for doing so.2 On the other hand, willingly withdrawing a claim earned by
force can also undermine an army’s reputation, and this may be very costly in future
or concurrent conflicts. Fearon (1994) suggests that leaders can strategically create
this sort of audience costs in order to signal credibly their resolve given that backing
down from claims can jeopardize their tenure. However, these costs may also lead to
lock-in situations and force leaders to wage war. Schultz (1998) points out that the
existence of domestic political opposition can help to create commitment by pushing
the government towards tough stances. This was the case of Democratic party in the
1
‘While it is hard for a government, particularly a responsible government, to appear as irrational whenever
such appearance is expedient, it is equally hard for a government, particularly a responsible one, to guarantee
its own moderation in every circumstance.’ (Schelling 1966, p. 41).
2 See O’Neil (1999).
123
SERIEs (2012) 3:157–179 159
eve of the Spanish–American War, or the Liberal Party of Britain during the Fashoda
crisis. Finally, Jackson and Morelli (2007) show that countries can go to war because
of political bias, that is, the difference in incentives between the society as a whole
and pivotal decision makers who can be inclined to make excessive demands.
Claims can also emerge from the (perceived) lack of divisibility of the issue in
dispute. Claim states can be interpreted as situations in which one side has obtained
the temporary military control of an item, a territory or landmark. Examples include
oil fields (as in the case of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990), diamond mines, sacred
places (Hassner 2003), territories considered as “homeland” (Toft 2006) or even office
of a country (as in the War of Spanish Succession). Because their nature only one or
few divisions of these objects are feasible. But as Goddard (2006) argues, indivisibil-
ity is not necessarily fixed. For instance, Jerusalem was not treated as indivisible by
the early Israeli leadership; nor it was the sovereignty of Ireland until the twentieth
century.3 Hence indivisibility can change with time or be overcome if parties agree to
use transfers or compensations.
Coming back to the description of the model, rejection of proposals during bargain-
ing states or opposition to claims during claim states make the game continue with
the conflict unresolved. This is costly to both parties because it causes delay. In the
following period, the state of the game can change from a bargaining state into a claim
state, or vice-versa. These changes are randomly determined by transition probabilities
which depend on the strength of each side. This feature is admittedly a reduced form
of the processes mentioned above; our main focus is on the effects of these frictions
on bargaining rather than on their causes. But random transitions between states also
capture the inherent and prevalent randomness that defines military confrontations.
As Clausewitz (1976) quite eloquently put it, “War is the province of chance.”
Our analysis takes off with the characterization of equilibria under complete infor-
mation, when the persistence of claims and the strength of the players are known.
For any value of the parameters agreement prevails immediately in bargaining states.
As usual in alternating-offer bargaining, the proposer offers a share that leaves the
responder just indifferent to her continuation value upon confrontation, which is
accepted. The (potential) gains attainable in claim states determine the terms of agree-
ment, but players never resort to confrontation. Exploring the circumstances in which
claims are effective and induce surrender provides the main insight of this part of the
analysis: when a claim is established, either it induces surrender or else it is met by
opposition until it is dismissed by force. Very extreme claims (relative to their per-
sistence upon confrontation) give such a small payoff to the opponent that she never
surrenders. Thus, when claims are sufficiently big, confrontation prevails at every
period until the bargaining state is re-established. This observation becomes crucial
when we address the effect of uncertainty and private information.
In the second part of the paper we drop the assumption that transitions between
states are governed by publicly known probabilities and we introduce uncertainty.
Incomplete information is one of the most prominent causes of conflict in bargain-
ing (Sanchez-Pages 2011). Because power is difficult to observe and measure, parties
3 For Goddard (2006) indivisibility is the result of actors’ choices that may leave them locked in bargaining
positions. From that perspective, indivisibilities can be seen as the result of attaining commitment.
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typically ignore their strength in case of war and can only learn about it by fighting.
In order to account for this type of friction, we consider two layers of uncertainty.
One is that parties know their own type, hostile or lenient, but not the type of the
opponent. Second, at bargaining states, countries do not know how likely they (nor
their opponent) will be able to maintain control if the game moves to a claim state.
They just know the distribution from which the persistence of claims will be drawn.
This information becomes public when disagreement leads the game to a claim state.
Under these informational assumptions, war can arise even when the game starts
in a bargaining state: In the unique equilibrium strategy profile a very rich range of
outcomes may occur. These histories capture the different patterns that arise in real-
world disputes. For one set of parameters parties exchange a number of offers and
counteroffers before reaching an agreement. This is consistent with the observation
that many interstate disputes do not entail actual hostilities, like the Second Moroccan
Crisis of 1911 or the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. For natural parameter config-
urations war does start with positive probability. If the claim state does not induce
immediate surrender because the claim is too large, a (potentially very long) phase
of confrontation follows until the claim is dismissed. In bargaining states, proposals
that are initially rejected may eventually be accepted after a long conflict. This was
the case for instance in the negotiations between Egypt and Israel during the 70s or
between the IRA and the British government in the 1990s.
The intuition for these results is the following. The power to sustain claims is always
uncertain, but each party is privately informed about (the probability distribution of)
her own power. Hostile (lenient) types have a high (low) expectation of claim per-
sistence; and consequently expect high (low) payoffs in claim states. In bargaining
states—before any claim is established—the proposer can extract a large share from a
lenient responder because such type expects low returns from confrontation. Suppose
that the prior probability that the opponent is a lenient type is high so that the pro-
poser’s optimism—her anticipation that she can get a large share—has rational basis.
Then, in equilibrium, the proposer demands a share which is acceptable only by the
lenient type. But when the responder turns out to be a hostile type, rejection follows
and war takes place. If a claim is established in the sequel, and its realized persistence
is insufficient to induce surrender, war will continue.
As we obtain a unique equilibrium, which is easily computed, our model allows pre-
cise comparative statics: We measure the effect of changes of the different parameters
on the likelihood, duration and costs of war. We find that war occurs with positive prob-
ability provided that agents’ belief that the opponent is a lenient type is greater than a
given threshold. This threshold is increasing in the cost of confrontation, claims’ size,
and agents’ strength. Thus, departing from situations where war occurs with positive
probability, small parameter changes are irrelevant; but a sufficient increase drops the
probability of war to zero. A similar non-monotonicity holds with respect to the losses
of war. Our comparative statics on the likelihood and duration of wars are in line with
the empirical evidence on the onset and termination of interstate conflicts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our work to the liter-
ature. The model is formally presented in Sect. 3. Section 4 discusses environments of
complete information. The main results are in Sect. 5 where incomplete information
is assumed. Proofs can be found in the Appendix.
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2 Related literature
The first formulation of war as a joint process of bargaining and fighting was due
to Clausewitz in his treaty of 1832. Clausewitz’s ideas inspired many others, most
notably Blainey (1973) who was especially insightful in his analysis of the causes
of war. He was the first one to argue that optimism about the own capabilities was
behind most armed conflicts throughout history. In line with this, Wittman (1979)
argued that increasing the probability of military victory can reduce the probability
of agreement because the now stronger party becomes more demanding. Our results
formally support these two intuitions.
Following Blainey, Wagner (2000) argues wars are processes by which parties
learn each others’ real forces and costs—thus opening the door to agreements that
are impossible without war. Although he does not offer formal results, his discussion
of the process by which wars start, develop and end is suggestive: wars commence
because inconsistent expectations on the consequences of fighting initially prevent the
existence of agreements that both parties prefer to confrontation; as fighting proceeds
expectations are adjusted and mutual gains from agreement arise.4
These insights spawned a generation of bargaining models that explored these ideas
formally. Filson and Werner (2002) discuss a very special (two-period, two-type) for-
mulation, and emphasize the role of battlefield resource availability. Powell (2004)
models war as a costly process of bargaining during which parties run the risk of
military collapse; he considers uncertainties over either power or the cost of fighting,
which allows comparisons of the learning processes induced in each case. Sanchez-
Pages (2009) examines the effects of limited confrontations on efficiency when they
reveal information about the balance of power. In that case, battles have an ambiguous
effect on welfare because they can help parties to become more realistic but they can
also be used to obtain advantage at the bargaining table. The models proposed by
Slantchev (2003) and Smith and Stam (2004) are the closest to ours. These authors
build on Smith (1998) where, as in the present paper, war is a Markov game. Sides fight
for the control of a number of forts and war terminates when one of the sides captures
all of them. These papers focus on how these limited conflicts shape agreements and
influence the duration of wars.
With the exception of Smith and Stam (2004), the models above assume one-
sided private information with common priors. They show that separating equilibria
can be sustained and provide insights on the process of information revelation
that unravels through war based on the properties of equilibria. However, as
Powell (2004) emphasizes, these results are extremely sensitive to the details of
the game or the equilibrium notion. A general problem in all these models is
the great multiplicity of equilibria, which makes comparative statics very prob-
lematic. Furthermore, the assumption that one of the parties is fully informed has
4 The role of asymmetric information in fueling costly conflict is well known in the theoretic literature.
Banks (1990), Bester and Warneryd (2006), Fearon (1995) and Powell (1996, 1999) propose game-theoretic
analysis of war focusing on the role of asymmetric information in prompting disagreement in negotiations
prior to fighting—taking war as an outside option. As war is considered a game-ending move, the scope of
these models is limited to the analysis of the onset of war.
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such powerful implications that conclusions cannot extend to setups with two-
sided incomplete information. Smith and Stam (2004) argue that war arises due
to disagreements on beliefs, and formulate such disagreement as different prior
beliefs on military capabilities. Their approach is effective in supplying tractable
and transparent predictions. Such predictions, however, rely on the specific details
of these beliefs; this requires common knowledge of the non-common priors, an
assumption which is inconsistent with any presumption of full rationality by the
parties.
The present paper shares with Smith and Stam (2004) the premise that disagree-
ments on beliefs are crucial, but maintains the analysis in the realm of Bayesian games
with common priors. This comes at the price of being unable to explore the role of war
as a process of information transmission; in our model private information triggers
war, but it is commitment to claims what sustains its continuation. However, thanks
to the simplicity of the informational set up, our model delivers a unique equilib-
rium which is straightforward to characterize, and allows a symmetric treatment of
agents.
Claim states capture two other rationalist explanations for war. One is commit-
ment. In the strategic literature, it has long been recognized that unilateral commit-
ment awards advantage; and that attempts to attain commitment or to dismiss that of
opponents’ are a fundamental source of conflict (Crawford 1982; Schelling 1960).
Another branch of the literature has highlighted the inability of states to commit to
refrain from using force once they have obtained military advantage as a fundamental
cause of war (Fearon 1995; Powell 2006). The second explanation is issue indivisi-
bility: When the set of possible agreements that states can reach is small, their ability
to strike a bargain that all parties prefer to war is severely limited. Toft (2006) argues
that issue indivisibility is a truly distinctive cause of war and argues that it provides
a better explanation of ethnic conflict than commitment or incomplete information
problems. On the other hand, Powell (2006) argues that indivisibility is just one type
of commitment problem; it is lack of commitment, not the inherent nature of the issue,
what prevents states from expanding the set of possible agreements on an issue (by
using lotteries, transfers or issue linkage). The present analysis remains agnostic on
this debate. Both types of bargaining frictions can be present in our model via claim
states.
Finally, the equilibrium of the game features a rich variety of outcomes that cap-
ture the variety of patterns in real-world disputes. As pointed out by Leventoglu and
Tarar (2008), bargaining models of war rarely allow the possibility of an agreement
being reached after a peaceful exchange of offers and counteroffers. Either agreement
is immediate or conflict takes place. For a set of parameters, the equilibrium of the
game entails an agreement being reached after some rounds of bargaining and without
escalation.5 In other cases war follows after a failure of negotiations. This conflict
may be long and full of “fortune reversals”.
5 Some other mechanisms can deliver agreements without escalation. Schultz (1998) shows that domestic
political competition can make government’s threats credible under incomplete information. Bevia and
Corchon (2010) explore the role of pre-war transfers as a conflict-prevention mechanism in the absence of
commitment.
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3 The game
Two players i = 1, 2 must split one unit of surplus. Time is discrete t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
The state of the game establishes the moves available for each player at each date.
There are four possible states, two bargaining states sbi , where no player holds a claim
and bargaining proceeds with an exchange of proposals, and two claim states, sci in
which one player holds a claim and bargaining is suspended. In state sbi , player i is
the proposer, she chooses a proposal, any pair (xi , 1− xi ), 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, then, player j ,
decides whether to accept or reject. On the other hand, in state sci , only player j = i
moves, and her choices are opposition or surrender. Surrender terminates the game,
i takes her claim ci , 1/2 < ci ≤ 1, and j gets 1 − ci . Upon rejection or opposition,
one period of confrontation takes place and the game moves to the following period.
When confrontation occurs at t the state at t + 1, st+1, is randomly determined with
probabilities that depend on the state at t, st , according to the transition probability
matrix of Table 1.
The parameters qit and 1 − pit measure i’s strength, respectively at defense and
attack: qit is the probability that player i will maintain her claim into period t + 1 (i.e.
the persistence of player i’s claim at t) while 1 − pit is the probability that player i
establishes a claim when she rejects a proposal in bargaining state sbj . Alternatively,
1 − pit can be interpreted as the probability that a hawkish leader or general comes
into power and takes an intransigent stance on the issue in dispute. On the other hand,
it is possible to interpret the value of persistence qit also as the probability that the
expected costs of backing down from a claim—either reputational or due to domestic
audiences—or the costs of deposing a hawkish leader exceed a certain threshold and
become prohibitive.
Confrontation is costly because players are impatient. The dispute terminates only
with surrender in claim states, or else, in bargaining states, with an agreement. Upon
a termination that allocates shares (zi , 1 − zi ) at date t agent i obtains δt zi , with
0 < δ < 1. When the outcome of the game is perpetual confrontation both agents
obtain 0.
A history of the game at t is a sequence of states of the game from 0 to t, the rejected
proposals or opposed claims from 0 to t −1, and possibly a standing proposal. A strat-
egy for player i, denoted σi , selects the action of player i at each history in which she
must move. A strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium if, at every history, the
actions of both players are mutually best responses. A strategy profile is stationary if
Table 1 The matrix of transition probabilities between states
t\t+1 sb1 sb2 sc1 sc2
sb1
p2t
2
p2t
2 0 1 − p2t
sb2
p1t
2
p1t
2 1 − p1t 0
sc1
1−q1t
2
1−q1t
2 q1t 0
sc2
1−q2t
2
1−q2t
2 0 q2t
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actions depend only on the state of the game. We use the term equilibrium to refer to
a subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies.
The present game is related to the general class of bargaining games studied in
Merlo and Wilson (1995), where the set of admissible agreements and the bargaining
protocol follow a Markov process. Unfortunately our analysis cannot build on theirs
since their characterization of equilibria relies on the assumption that, at all states,
agents can choose an agreement from a standard bargaining set; this assumption fails
in our game because in claim states there is a unique feasible termination.
4 Equilibria when strength is known
Assume that transition probabilities are known and remain constant qit = qi , pit = pi
for all t, and let 0 < qit , pit ≤ 1, i = 1, 2. Absorbing claim states correspond to the
case where qi = 1. On the other hand, it is straightforward to see that when pi = 1,
so claim states do not exist, peace prevails immediately with the split (1 − δ2 , δ2 ).
Equilibrium outcomes and payoffs depend on whether claims meet opposition or
surrender. We will show that agreement necessarily prevails in bargaining states. Sur-
render may prevail under both claim states, in one but not in the other, or opposition
may occur in both. We will prove that only the first and the third scenario exclude
each other.6 We say that i’s claim ci is relevant at a given equilibrium σ , if it pays i at
least as much as one period of confrontation; that is ci ≥ δ(qivi (sci ) + (1 − qi )vi ),
where vi denotes player i’s average payoffs in bargaining states and vi (sci ) denotes
her expected payoffs in state sci . Formally, the following condition assures that the
claims of both players are relevant.7
RC: Claims are relevant, for i = 1, 2,
ci ≥ max
{
(1 − qi )δ
1 − δqi ,
1
2
}
. (1)
We start examining how the prevalence of agreement/surrender is linked across
states. Observe than in equilibrium, the following remarks apply:
• If surrender prevails in state sci , then agreement is reached in state sbj .
• If surrender prevails in states sc1 and sc2, then agreement prevails in states sb1 and
sb2.
To understand the first observation, note that, in a bargaining state with 2 as proposer,
a disagreement would prevail if and only if 1 preferred to reject any share that 2 were
willing to propose; that is if δ(p1v1 + (1 − p1)c1) ≥ 1 − δ(p1v2+ (1 − p1)(1 − c1)),
or equivalently p1(v1 + v2) + (1 − p1) ≥ 1δ , but the latter inequality cannot hold
since v1 + v2 ≤ 1 in any equilibrium. Similarly if surrender prevails in sc2, then
6 Consequently, the uniqueness of stationary equilibria—a standard feature in bargaining games of alter-
nating proposals—is not assured in asymmetric environments.
7 ci ≥ δ(1−qi )1−δqi implies that ci ≥ δ(qi ci + (1 − qi )vi ) for all vi ≤ 1; that is, a share ci dominates the
payoff from continuation even if the payoff in the bargaining state is 1.
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disagreement cannot prevail at sb1. Our second observation follows immediately from
the first.
We therefore conclude that confrontation cannot occur in bargaining states. If there
is confrontation in equilibrium, it must occur in a claim state. Is opposition possible in
claim states, or do claims always induce surrender? A claim ci cannot induce surrender
when the share obtained upon surrender, 1 − ci , is bounded above by the expected
gains of an additional period of confrontation. That is, when
1 − ci < δ(qiv j (sci ) + (1 − qi )v j ), (2)
where v j (sci ) denotes j’s expected payoffs in sci . If (2) holds opposition prevails, so
expected payoffs v j (sci ) and vi (sci ) must solve v j (sci ) = δ(qiv j (sci ) + (1 − qi )v j )
and vi (sci ) = δ(qivi (sci ) + (1 − qi )vi ); therefore v j (sci ) = (1−qi )δv j1−δqi and vi (sci ) =
(1−qi )δvi
1−δqi . Substituting the expected payoffs in (2), we obtain that the necessary and
sufficient condition for surrender at sci is
1 − ci ≥ (1 − qi )δv j1 − δqi . (3)
Writing
φi (v j ) ≡ 1 − ci − δv j
δ(1 − ci − v j ) , (4)
condition (3) is equivalent to qi ≥ φi (v j ); in other words, the claim “must not be
merely transient,” 8 it must persist at least with probability φi (v j ). If claims are too
temporary then it pays to the other side to resist them and hope for military success to
reverse the situation back to a bargaining state.9 Then it follows (see the Appendix for
a detailed argument) that confrontation prevails only in claim states. This completes
the proof of our first proposition:
Proposition 1 Assume RC. In equilibrium the following hold:
1. Persistent claims award advantage in claim states, player j surrenders and the
split (ci , 1 − ci ) is imposed if and only if qi ≥ φi (v j ).
2. Confrontation only in claim states. Termination, by agreement or surrender, is
immediate unless a claim state occurs and qi ≤ φi (v j ).
Proposition 1 implies that any equilibrium profile must be one of the following
three: (a) A confrontation profile, where agreement is reached in bargaining states,
and confrontation prevails otherwise. (b) A peaceful profile, where agreement or sur-
render occurs at all states. (c) An i−advantage profile, where agreement or surrender
occurs in all states except scj .
8
‘If the enemy is to be coerced you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sac-
rifice that you call on him to make. The hardships of that situation must not of course be merely transient.
Otherwise the enemy would not give in but would wait for things to improve’ (Clausewitz 1976).
9 Note that φi (v j ) is strictly increasing in v j and satisfies 0 < φi (v j ) < 1, if and only if δv j ≥ 1 − ai .
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The complete characterization of equilibria in general, non symmetric, environments
involves straightforward but rather tedious algebra. We present it as Proposition 5 in the
Appendix. Here we concentrate in symmetric environments; that is those satisfying:
SYM Strengths are symmetric; for i = 1, 2, ci = c, qi = q and pi = p.
Under SYM an equilibrium cannot be an i−advantage profile; and the equilibrium
expected payoffs at bargaining states are v = 12 . Therefore, in claim states, surrender
prevails if and only if q ≥ φ( 12 ) = δ/2−(1−c)δ(c−1/2) . Then a unique equilibrium exists and it
is easily described:
Proposition 2 Equilibrium in symmetric environments with complete information.
Under RC and SYM there is a unique equilibrium.
1. When q ≥ δ/2−(1−c)
δ(c−1/2) , the equilibrium is a peaceful profile: In state sbi , i offers to
j a share δ[p 12 + (1 − p)(1 − c)] and she accepts; in state sci , j surrenders and
i’s claim of share c is imposed.
2. When q < δ/2−(1−c)
δ(c−1/2) , the equilibrium is a confrontation profile: In state sbi , i
offers to j a share δ2 [p + (1 − p) (1−q)δ(1−δq) ] and she accepts; in state sci , confronta-
tion prevails.
This proposition shows that the persistence of claims awards an advantage in war
but not necessarily their size. When persistence is high so the equilibrium profile is
peaceful, parties can appease their opponent with lower offers compared to the case
where claim states do not exist, i.e. p = 1. But when persistence is low enough to
induce a confrontation equilibrium, claims are met with opposition and because they
are too temporary, bigger concessions take place in bargaining states compared to
when claims do not take place. On the other hand, note that φ( 12 ) is increasing in c so
sizeable claims are more likely to meet opposition; thus players prefer to avoid them
when they are in a bargaining state. This follows a simple but fundamental principle
already advised in 510 BC in Sun Tzu’s Art of War: “Do not press a desperate foe too
hard.”
As long as the game starts in a bargaining state, an agreement prevails immediately
and claims are never raised. Still, if the game begins in a claim state and persistence
q is relatively low, there is confrontation until the claim is dismissed and a bargaining
state arises. In a nutshell, under complete information, from a bargaining state “one
would never need to use the physical impact of the fighting forces—comparing figures
and their strength would be enough.” (Clausewitz 1976, p. 76).
The fact is, however, that in real conflicts parties do resort to confrontation attempt-
ing to raise claims, expecting that these will be imposed quickly. But demands often
meet resistance and frequently reverse. Why would then rational agents engage in
confrontation to attempt establishing a claim that might eventually prove so disadvan-
tageous? We give an answer this question in the next section, as we extend our model
to account for uncertainty and asymmetric information.
5 Uncertainty and asymmetric information
According to Blainey a common trait of wars is that the two parties “were persuaded
to fight because most of their leaders were excessively optimistic and impatient men,
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SERIEs (2012) 3:157–179 167
and persuaded to cease fighting because those leaders, having failed, were replaced
by more cautious men.” (Blainey 1973, p. 123). We propose a formal set up in which
Blainey’s description holds precisely. We extend our model to address situations with
uncertainty and asymmetric information and show that in these circumstances, con-
frontations might arise (and persist) along the equilibrium path even if the initial state
is a bargaining state.
Our basic assumption is that the probabilities by which players sustain the commit-
ment to their claims are unknown a priori; they have a random value that is realized only
after claims are established. In a bargaining state, when a player considers whether to
reject an offer, she has some private information about the strength of her potential
claim, but she learns the precise value of this strength only if, and after, the claim is
established. We assume that there are two types of players, that we name hostile and
lenient, and that types are private information. A hostile type draws the persistence
of her claims from a distribution biased towards high values; since she expects that
her claim will be highly persistent and induce the opponent’s surrender, she is more
inclined to engage in confrontation and consequently is more demanding in bargain-
ing states. A lenient type, expecting that her claims will have low persistence and
induce opposition, is not inclined to confrontation and therefore accommodates to
lower offers.
An offer is separating if it is acceptable to a lenient opponent but unacceptable to
a hostile opponent; a pooling offer is one acceptable by both types. Suppose that the
proposer makes a separating offer; this triggers war if the responder turns out to be
hostile. Running the risk of war may well be ex-ante optimal (vis à vis to a pooling
offer) when the probability of facing a lenient opponent is high enough. Hence sepa-
rating offers are an equilibrium phenomenon when the proposer is an optimist—her
prior beliefs assign high probability to the opponent being lenient—opening the door
to war if the responder is a hostile type. Confrontation leads to a claim state with
positive probability; upon this event the persistence of the claim is learned. If such
persistence turns out to be high, the (initial) proposer must surrender. But even a hostile
type, that ex ante expects a high persistence, may get a low draw. Then both players
realize that reality has not matched their (rational) expectations, but they are stuck in
confrontation until the claim is dismissed.
We will consider a symmetric environment where q1 and q2 are random variables
whose value is realized only after the respective claim is established. After a player
rejects a proposal and her claim state occurs, the probability to defend the claim is
publicly observed and it remains constant over time as long as the game remains in the
same state; if the game returns to a bargaining state, future realizations of qi are drawn
independently. With this assumption, we do not impose strengths to be constant as often
done in the literature, and we can also account for the inherent randomness of war.
We assume that agents have private information on the distribution function of their
own qi . Each period that the game is in a bargaining state, players privately observe
their type (the distribution of qi ) for that period. Formally we assume:
U1 c1 = c2 = c > 12 and p1 = p2 = p, and these are known.
U2 There are two types of players, τi ∈ {l, h}, at each st = sbj types are drawn
independently with probability
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Pr(τi = l | st = sbj ) = λ, 0 < λ < 1,
and realized types are private information.
U3 qi is drawn with distribution Fτi at each st = sci such that st−1 = sbj ; then it
becomes public and remains constant as long as the claim state persists.
U4 Fh first order stochastically dominates Fl : Fh(q) ≤ Fl(q) for all q ∈ [0, 1].
Assumptions U1, U2 and U3 are for simplicity. The first two could be relaxed (at
non-negligible notational and expositional cost) to account for larger type sets, asym-
metries and uncertainty on p and c, or serial correlation. Assumption U3 could also
be relaxed to allow that i retains some information advantage on qi after state sci is
realized, assuming that agents learn their own qi quickly while opponents must learn it
by the evidence that the claim persists. This extension would deliver equilibrium his-
tories where agents initially oppose claims but eventually surrender. U4 is the crucial
assumption.
A system of beliefs for player i, πi , maps histories into probability distributions over
the types of player j . A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is an assessment (σ, π) such
that, σ is a pair of strategies that are best response to each other at each history, and
π is a belief profile consistent with Bayes’ rule. At a Markov strategy actions depend
only on the state, the current beliefs and the current offer. Henceforth the term equi-
librium refers to perfect Bayesian equilibrium in Markov strategies. Observe that an
equilibrium is fully characterized by specifying proposals and acceptance/surrender
thresholds for each type at each state. Note that the system of beliefs does not need to
be specified beyond Bayes Rule because, at any off the equilibrium history that is not
terminal, either a claim state is attained and q is fully revealed; or the game remains
in the bargaining state and new types are drawn—in which case players must believe
that their opponent is lenient with probability λ.
Fix an equilibrium and let v denote the ex-ante (before types are drawn) expected
gains of players in bargaining states. (Note that, if rejections occur with positive prob-
ability, v < 12 ). Observe that in state sci if the probability that i maintains her claim one
more period is sufficiently small disagreement prevails: Indeed, by the same argument
used to prove Proposition 1 we know that if state sci occurs the game stays in confron-
tation as long as qi ≤ q̂, where q̂ = φ(v) [recall that φ(v) is determined by Eq. (4)].
Otherwise, for qi > q̂, player j surrenders and the split (c, 1 − c) is imposed.10
The equilibrium is pooling—so the first proposal is accepted regardless of the
responder’s type and immediate agreement prevails—if and only if the probability
that players are of lenient type is not too high. Otherwise, the equilibrium is separat-
ing. Along the separating equilibrium play proceeds as follows. Player i makes an offer
that leaves j indifferent between acceptance and rejection if she is lenient (and that a
hostile j strictly prefers to reject). Upon rejection, with probability p a new round of
bargaining follows whereas the game enters state scj with probability 1 − p. If state
scj is realized, then the value of q j is observed by both parties. Immediate surrender
to shares (c, 1 − c) follows if and only if q j satisfies q j ≥ q̂; otherwise confrontation
10 Note that 0 < q̂ < 1 only if c + δv > 1.
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continues until the claim is dismissed. At a new bargaining state, players observe their
new type, a new separating offer is made, and so on.
For a given equilibrium with ex-ante expected gains v, we let rl(v) and rh(v) denote
the responder’s expected gains upon rejection in state sbi , respectively for a lenient
and a hostile responder. Also, Rh(v) denotes the proposer’s continuation value when
her opponent rejects and the updated belief induced by rejection assigns probability 1
to the hostile type. Now, define λv as the ratio:
λv ≡ 1 − r
h(v) − Rh(v)
1 − rl(v) − Rh(v) , (5)
and we will refer to λv=1/2 as the optimism threshold.
We are now ready to describe the unique equilibrium:
Proposition 3 Equilibrium in symmetric environments with private information.
Under assumptions U1–U4 there is a unique equilibrium outcome.
1. If the ex-ante probability of facing a lenient type exceeds the optimism threshold,
that is λ > λ1/2, then the equilibrium is separating. For all t, in state sbi , i offers
x∗ = rl(v∗) and j accepts only if τ j = l. If τ j = h and st+1 = scj player i sur-
renders granting c to j if q j ≥ φ(v∗); for q j < φ(v∗(λ)) confrontation prevails
at all t + k until st+k = sbi .
2. Otherwise, the equilibrium is pooling. For all t, in state sbi , i offers y∗ = rh( 12 )
and j accepts.
In bargaining states war starts because the proposer’s optimism, expecting a lenient
responder with high probability, is not confirmed; it continues in claim states because
the realized persistence disappoints the optimist belief of the hostile type. The former
effect is the well-known risk-return trade-off in the literature on bargaining and war
(Sanchez-Pages 2011). The latter is novel to our model; it is due to the commitment
associated with claim states. In summary, war occurs when reality disappoints the
proposer’s optimism; and persists longer when both agents have optimist (rational)
expectations that are not realized ex-post.
5.1 Equilibrium histories: types of wars
It is now immediate that when λ > λ1/2, so that a separating equilibrium prevails, a
great variety of equilibrium histories are possible, including prolonged confrontation
and fortune reversals. Three categories of wars are possible:
1. Stalemated war An agreement ( 12 ,
1
2 ) does not prevail until t = k > 1. Prior to
agreement k − 1 proposals meet rejection because a hostile responder is drawn
but neither side ever raised a claim, at t = k the responder type is lenient and
agreement prevails.
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2. War with victory A concession to (c, 1 − c) prevails at t = k + 1. After sequence
of k ≥ 1 rejections in the bargaining state the game enters a claim state at k + 1,
then upon the observation that q ≥ qˆ the opponent surrenders.11
3. Fortune reversal War prevails at least for t = k + n periods; from t = 0 to k ≥ 1
proposals meet rejection, a claim is established at t = k + 1, q is low, the claim is
opposed and it persists for n periods. The continuation might lead to immediate
agreement or to any history of type 1, 2 or 3.
Stalemated wars end in a negotiated settlement. These account for around 65% of
interstate wars (Leventoglu and Slantchev 2007). If rejection of proposals does not
imply necessarily the outbreak of hostilities, this equilibrium outcome would also
account for disputes, such as the Cuban Missiles Crisis or the 2007 North-Korea
nuclear crisis, that did not escalate into war.
Fortune reversals are conflicts in which initial claims are reversed and war proves
to be a disaster to the party that attempted to establish them. In the summer of 480
BC Xerxes was about to impose his advantage over Athens: the Persian alliance with
Carthage assured control over the Greek colonies in Sicily and many of the smaller
Greek states were eager to settle peacefully. Still Athens refused to yield and fortunes
were reversed at Salamis. Napoleon’s Russian campaign of 1812 successfully reached
Moscow, yet it failed “because the Russian government kept its nerve and the people
remained loyal and steadfast” (Clausewitz 1976, p. 628). In the summer of 1940 Hitler
was celebrating victory and awaiting Churchill to sue for peace; he did not, and events
took a very different course. Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland in April of 1982
and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 also fall under this category. Wars such as the
Korean and the Vietnam wars, where parties alternated claims but none was imposed
at the end, are combinations of fortune reversals and stalemated conflicts.
For realizations of the parameters that deliver a separating equilibrium, the probabil-
ity of an immediate agreement is λ; and the probability of a stalemated confrontation is
(1−λ)(1− p) each period. To evaluate the ex-ante likelihood of victories and fortune
reversals we must measure Pr(q ≥ qˆ), which requires a specification of Fl(q) and
Fh(q). For simplicity and for the remainder of the paper, we will assume that Fl(q) is
a degenerate distribution and Fh(q) a two point distribution; the lenient type draws a
low q < 1/2 with probability 1, and the hostile type draws the low q with probability
1 − α and a high q = 1, with probability α. Under these assumptions, the ex-ante
probability of a war with victory (fortune reversals) is (1 − λ)αp((1 − λ)(1 − α)p)
per period.
5.2 The likelihood of war
War occurs with positive probability only when the optimism threshold is low enough,
that is λ1/2 < λ < 1. When this inequality holds, the probability that war starts is
11 The assumption that q becomes public immediately when the claim state is realized rules out equilibria
where claims are initially challenged but eventually prevail. Such histories might occur in equilibrium under
the assumption that agents learn their own q quickly while opponents must learn it by the evidence that the
claim persists.
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Fig. 1 λ1/2 as a function of δ
for c = 0.65 and 0.85
Fig. 2 λ1/2 as a function of c
for δ = 0.7 and 0.8
1−λ > 0 at every period that the game spends in the bargaining state. Consequently, to
evaluate how changes in the environment translate into changes on the probability that
war starts, we must examine λ1/2 = 1−rh(1/2)−Rh(1/2)1−rl (1/2)−Rh(1/2) , as a function of the parameters
δ, p, c, and α.
The values of 1 − p and α measure the strength of players upon confrontation;
greater values translate in increases of the agents’ continuation values. Consequently,
∂λ1/2
∂p ≥ 0, ∂λ1/2∂α ≤ 0, with strict inequality whenever λ1/2 < 1. Evaluating ∂λ1/2∂δ and
∂λ1/2
∂c
requires some algebra, but it is not hard to check that, λ1/2 is strictly decreasing
both in δ and in c. Figures 1 and 2 display λ1/2 as a function of δ and c for α and the
low q fixed at 1/2.
We summarize these observations in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 The optimism threshold λ1/2 decreases, so the separating equilibrium
(and war) prevails for a wider range of prior belief λ, whenever one of the following
takes place:
1. Claims become more extreme.
2. The claim state arises with greater probability.
3. The hostile type expects greater persistence of claims.
4. Per-period losses decrease.
For Fl(q) and Fh(q) fixed, the size of claims c and the cost of confrontation 1− δ,
have impact only over the threshold λ1/2, and not on the effective probability of war
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1 − λ. Hence, small changes in c or δ are inconsequential. However, bigger changes
can either drop the probability of confrontation from 1−λ to 0, or bring it up from 0 to
1−λ. For example, let q = α = 1/2, λ = 0.83, c = 0.8, and δ = 0.8. In this environ-
ment λ1/2 = 0.79 < λ = 0.83 < 1; so war occurs with probability 1 − λ = 0.17. A
small change in δ has an effect on λ1/2 but, as long as the inequality λ1/2 < λ = 0.83
is maintained, it has no impact in the probability of war. However, with a change to
δ > 0.7, the inequality is reversed, and with λ1/2 > λ the probability of war drops to
zero. Thus, a sufficient increase in the costs of confrontation can eliminate the possi-
bility of war. This is consistent with the idea that the steady decrease observed in the
number of wars since 1816 (Gleditsch 2004, p. 243) might be due to the development
and use of more deadly technologies of warfare.
Likewise, small changes in c have no impact in the probability of war but a suffi-
cient decrease in c, say to c < 0.7, drops the probability of war to zero. Interpreting
c as the value of a special landmark, our results are consistent with a established fact,
especially in the context of civil wars (Ross 2003), that links the prevalence of war
with the presence of natural resources. If, alternatively, we interpret c as the salience of
the issue provoking the dispute, our results are consistent with the fact that satisfaction
with the status quo (low c) decreases the likelihood of conflict between Major Powers
(Lemke and Reed 2001).
5.3 The losses and duration of war
The difference between potential gains and expected payoffs in equilibrium measures
the expected losses caused by war. Under a pooling equilibrium the ex-ante expected
payoff is v = 1/2 for each agent and therefore no loss is incurred. In a separating
equilibrium the expected loss is 1 − 2v > 0.
In the appendix we establish that under the present specification
v = 1
2
λ + (1 − λ)2g
1 − (1 − λ)h ,
where h ≡ δ(p+ (1−p)δ(1−q)α1−δq ) and g ≡ δ(1−p)(1−α)2 . It is easily checked that 2g+h <
1, and therefore ∂v
∂λ
= 12 1−h−2g(1−h+hλ)2 > 0. Thus, the worse outcomes are attained at
the lower values of λ that satisfy λ > λ1/2. Figure 3 displays the expected gains
as functions of λ for c = 0.7, α = p = q = 0.5, and δ = 0.9. On the other
hand, v increases in δ. Figure 4 displays the expected gains as a functions of δ for
c = 0.7, α = p = q = 0.5, and λ = 0.7. It is also immediate that v increases in p and
decreases in q and α. Let us emphasize that the qualitative features of this illustrative
example are general.
Finally, it is straightforward to see that when λ ≥ λ1/2, other parameters fixed, the
probability of a “War with victory” Pr(q ≥ qˆ) is greater the lower λ, and the lower c.
This has two implications: First, that shorter wars are more likely, i.e. Pr(q ≥ qˆ) is
higher, when the probability of drawing a hostile type is greater. And second, that
fortune reversals are more likely, i.e. Pr(q ≥ qˆ) is lower, and thus wars last longer,
when the value of claims increases. The latter effect is consistent with the fact that
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Fig. 3 Expected gains as a
function of λ, δ = 0.9
Fig. 4 Expected gains as a
function of δ
civil wars in resource-rich nations are harder to end (Ross 2003) and with the fact that
higher issue salience worsens the outcome of war for initiator countries (Slantchev
2004).
6 Final remarks
We have presented a model of bargaining and war where the set of admissible agree-
ments follows a Markov process. Our contribution points out that, when the ability
to impose claims is linked to the use of force, uncertainties and informational asym-
metries may fuel prolonged episodes of confrontation. The richness of equilibrium
outcomes (despite the equilibrium being unique) can account for the wide variety
of patterns observed in wars. Our comparative statics are also consistent with some
empirical studies on the onset and termination of interstate wars.
We carried out this analysis for the simplest scenario, assuming that there are only
two states, and that transitions are governed by stationary probabilities. Real conflicts
have immense sets of states and their transition probabilities are hardly stationary.
Nevertheless the qualitative nature of our results does not rely on our drastic sim-
plifications. Results would remain unchanged if the responder chose between accep-
tance, rejection without confrontation, and rejection with confrontation. At the cost
of increased complexity we could also consider larger state sets—for example a state
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in which both players hold incompatible claims; or we could admit richer transitions
probabilities. The cost of confrontation could also be asymmetric across players and
or states. Our results are robust to such alternative formulations. We hope they can
provide useful intuitions relevant in the analysis of real, more complex, disputes and
guide a revised look at the empirical evidence.
One key assumption of our analysis is that claims entail commitment to a specific
division—for instance because a party attaining (temporary) control of the landmark
is not free to back down and bargain unless she is defeated in confrontation. Audience
costs, reputation, indivisibilities, extremism and nationalism can explain these rigid-
ities. Still, the value of these claims and the probabilities to establish and maintain
them have been assumed exogenous. In reality, however, these probabilities depend
on the degree of advantage aimed by a player; as well as on the opponent’s strength
and claim value. An extension of our model allowing that bargaining parameters are
interrelated and endogenously determined by the strategic choice of the agents will be
the object of further research.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
source are credited.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 By Eq. (1), the responder payoffs in state sbi are such that
if (q1, q2)  (φ1(v2), φ2(v1)), vri = δvi
(
pi + (1 − pi ) (1 − qi )δ1 − γ qi
)
,
if (q1, q2) 	 (φ1(v2), φ2(v1)), vri = δ(pivi + (1 − pi )ai ),
while the proposer obtains v pj = 1 − vri .
Clearly agreement must prevail in a state sbi when confrontation prevails in both
claim states. Hence we only need to consider strategy profiles that yield concession in
state sci but not in state scj .
Consider first profiles that yield concession in state sc1 but not in state sc2. When 1
proposes, 2 accepts as long as her share is at least vr2 = δv2(p2 + (1 − p2) (1−q2)γ(1−γ q2) ),
and thus agreement can be attained if and only if 1 prefers to offer that share over
disagreement. That is,
δv1
(
p2 + (1 − p2) (1 − q2)δ
(1 − δq2)
)
≤ 1 − δv2
(
p2 + (1 − p2) (1 − q2)δ
(1 − vq2)
)
,
or equivalently v1 + v2 ≤ 1−δq2δ(δ(1−q2)+(1−δ)p2) . A condition that always holds since the
second term exceeds 1.
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Proof of Proposition 3 Fix an equilibrium. Given ex-ante expected gains at bargaining
states v, the continuation values upon a rejection rl(v) and rh(v) are
rl(v) = δ(pv + (1 − p)[vl + (1 − Fl(q̂))c]),
rh(v) = δ(pv + (1 − p)[vh + (1 − Fh(q̂))c]).
where τ ≡ δ ∫ q̂0 1−q1−δq d Fτ (q)dq. It is a matter of simple algebra to check that
rh(v) > rl(v).12 Similarly, the proposer’s continuation value upon responders rejec-
tion, when the induced beliefs are π is
Rπ (v) = pδv + (1 − p)δ [vπ + (1 − Fπ (q̂))(1 − c)] .
Recall that λv ≡ 1−rh(v)−Rh(v)1−rl (v)−Rh(v) , where Rh denotes Rπ when belief π assigns proba-
bility 1 to the hostile type.
Next, we point out that at a pooling equilibrium agreement prevails for sure in the
bargaining states. Assume for the sake of the argument that disagreement prevails
for sure in state sbi . It is then necessary that the proposer prefers disagreement to
an agreement that the lenient responder accepts, that is Rπ (v) > 1 − rl(v). How-
ever, at the hypothesized pooling equilibrium profile the beliefs of the proposer upon
rejection are G = λFl + (1 − λ)Fh so that the continuation value is Rg(v) =
δpv + δ(1 − p)[vg + (1 − G(q̂))(1 − c)]. It is then immediate to check that v ≤ 12
implies that Rg(v) + rl(v) < 1, a contradiction. Consequently, an equilibrium must
be either a pooling equilibrium where both types accept, or a separating equilibrium
where the responder accepts if and only if she is lenient.
Let us now discuss the necessary and sufficient conditions for pooling or separating
equilibria. Consider first a pooling equilibrium. Since in states sbi the initial proposal
is surely accepted, the complete symmetry of the environment implies that v = 12 . If
state sci occurs (off the equilibrium path) confrontation prevails for q < φ( 12 ). Hence
the responder’s rejection values are uniquely given as rl( 12 ) and rh( 12 ). On the other
hand, if a rejection were to reveal that the responder is hostile the proposer’s rejec-
tion value would be Rh( 12 ). By hypothesis, in state sbi , both types of responder must
accept, hence the proposer must offer y∗ = rh( 12 ). At the alleged pooling equilibrium
the proposer must prefer a sure payoff 1 − y∗ over making a lower offer, y′ < y∗,
and getting acceptance only if the responder is lenient. The least that must be offered
to obtain acceptance with positive probability is y′ = rl( 12 ), hence it is necessary
that 1 − rh( 12 ) ≥ λ(1 − rl( 12 )) + (1 − λ)Rh( 12 ); that is, the prior probability of the
lenient type must not exceed the optimism threshold at v = 12 , λ ≤ λ 12 . In addition to
necessary, this inequality is also sufficient for the existence of a pooling equilibrium:
It suffices that the belief of the proposer upon (off the equilibrium) rejection assigns
probability 1 to the hostile type.
12 rh(v)−rl (v) = (1− p)δ[v(h −l )+c(Fl (̂q)−Fh (̂q))]and observe that the right hand side is positive
if and only if c ≥ δv l−h
Fl (q̂)−Fh (q̂) , an inequality that holds, since c ≥
1
2 , δv <
1
2 and
l−h
Fl (q̂)−Fh (q̂) < 1.
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Next, consider a separating equilibrium. Note that v < 12 , because in state sbi
the proposer offers only the rejection value of the lenient type, x = rl(v), which is
accepted by l but not by h. Moreover, the proposers’s beliefs about q upon rejection
must be Fh so that the proposer rejection value is Rh(v). Since either player proposes
with equal probability, v must satisfy v = 12 (λrl(v)+(1−λ)rh(v))+ 12 (λ(1−rl(v))+
(1 − λ)Rh(v)), that simplifies
v = λ1
2
+ (1 − λ) R
h(v) + rh(v)
2
,
Denote the solution to this equation by v∗. This solution always exists, and it is unique.
(It is immediate to check that γ : [0, 1] → [0, 1], where γ (v) = v − λ 12 −(1 − λ)
Rh(v)+rh(v)
2 , is a contraction and therefore has a unique fixed point.) Furthermore, note
that 0 < v∗ < 12 . In state sbi , i must offer r
l(v∗); and this must be preferred to offering
rh(v∗), i.e.
λ ≥ λv∗ . (6)
Therefore the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a separating equi-
librium is that λ ≥ λ1/2 : since v∗ < 12 and λv is strictly increasing in v, λ > λ 12
implies that λ ≥ λv∗ . This completes the proof.
Computation of equilibrium values
In a separating equilibrium, the ex-ante expected payoff v must solve v = λ/2 + (1 −
λ)
rh(v)+Rh(v)
2 . It is easy to check that under the present specification for F
l(q) and
Fh(q),
rh(v) = δ
[
pv + (1 − p)
(
α
vδ(1 − q)
1 − δq + (1 − α)c
)]
,
and
Rh(v) = δ
[
pv + (1 − p)
(
α
vδ(1 − q)
1 − δq + (1 − α)(1 − c)
)]
;
so that
rh(v) + Rh(v)
2
= δv
[
p + (1 − p)α δ(1 − q)
1 − δq
]
+ δ(1 − p)(1 − α)1
2
.
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Writing h ≡ δ(p+ (1−p)δ(1−q)α1−δq ) and g ≡ δ(1−p)(1−α)2 , v must solve v= λ2+(1−λ)
(hv + g). Hence
v = 1
2
λ + (1 − λ)2g
1 − (1 − λ)h .
It is easily checked that 2g + h < 1, and therefore ∂v
∂λ
= 12 1−h−2g(1−h+hλ)2 > 0. Derivatives
with respect to other parameters are immediate.
Proposition 5 Equilibria in non-symmetric, complete information, environments
Under RC an equilibrium always exists. Moreover,
1. A peaceful equilibrium excludes the existence of a confrontation equilibrium.
Equilibria in 1-advantage strategies and 2-advantage strategies may coexist; and
these may coexist with either a peaceful equilibrium or a confrontation equilib-
rium.
2. The expected payoffs of player i in a bargaining state under the four categories
of (potential) equilibrium profiles, denoted σ c, σ p, σ 1 and σ 2, are:
vi (σ
p) vi (σ
i ) vi (σ
j ) vi (σ c)
1−δp j +δci (1−pi )−δc j (1−p j )
2−δ(pi +p j )
ρ j
ρ j +λi
λ j
ρi +λ j
ρ j
ρ2+ρ1
where ρi ≡ 1 − δpi − (1 − pi ) (1−qi )δ21−δqi and λi ≡ 1 − δ(pi + ci (1 − pi )).
Remark The multiplicity of stationary equilibria opens the door to subgame perfect
equilibria in which confrontation occurs in the bargaining state, provided that non-
stationary strategies are allowed. Since this is a standard result we do not elaborate it
further.
Proof The values of expected payoffs at bargaining states for each of the potential
equilibrium strategy profiles, σ c, σ p and σ i , i = 1, 2, follows from straightforward
algebra. It is also immediate to check that vii > max{vci , v pi } > min{vci , v pi } > v ji .
Given a configuration of parameters (c1,c2, p1, p2) define the sets
Qc = {(q1, q2) | (q1, q2)  (φ1(vc2), φ2(vc1))},
Q p = {(q1, q2) | (q1, q2) 	 (φ1(v p2 ), φ2(v p1 ))},
Qi = {(q1, q2) | qi > φi (vij ), q j ≤ φ j (vii )}.
Necessary and sufficient conditions to sustain each of the potential profiles as an
equilibrium are now immediate:
1. A peaceful equilibrium exists if and only if (q1, q2) ∈ Q p;
2. A confrontation equilibrium exits if and only if (q1, q2) ∈ Qc;
3. An i−advantage equilibrium exits if and only if (q1, q2) ∈ Qi .
123
178 SERIEs (2012) 3:157–179
Therefore what profiles can prevail as equilibria for each parameter configuration
depends on the specific geometry of Qc,Q p, Q1 and Q2. Consider first the set Q p
since it is specially simple: Since v pi is independent of (q1, q2), so is φi (v j ) and
consequently
Q p = {(q1, q2) | (q1, q2) 	 (q̂1, q̂2)}, (7)
where q̂i = φi (v pj ).
On the other hand, observe that Qc can be expressed as
Qc = {(q1, q2) | q1 ≤ ϕ1(q2), q2 ≤ ϕ2(q1)}, (8)
where y = ϕ1(q2) if and only if y solves y = φ1( ρ1(y)ρ2+ρ1(y) ), where ρi (y) ≡ 1 − δpi −
(1 − pi ) (1−y)δ21−δy ρi ; and analogously for ϕ2(q1). It is straightforward to check that the
functions ϕi are decreasing.
Note that Qc ∩ Q p = ∅. Indeed, since both ϕi are decreasing it is straightforward
to check that q̂1 > ϕ2(q̂2) and q̂2 > ϕ1(q̂1).
With respect to Qi observe that (vii , vij ) = ( ρ jρ j +λi ,
αi
ρ j +λi ) depends only on ci and
q j . Hence
Qi = {(q1, q2) | qi > ψi (q j ), q j ≤ q j }, (9)
where q j solves q j = φ j (vii ) =
1−c j −δ ρ jρ j +λi
δ(1−c j − ρ jρ j +λ j )
and ψi (q j ) is φi (vij ) =
1−ci −δ λiρ j +λi
δ(1−ci − λiρ j +λi )
.
Since vii > v
p
i we obtain that q j > q̂ j . Moreover, since φi is increasing, ψi (q j )
decreases in q j and furthermore ϕi (q j ) > ψi (q j ).
We have thus shown that Qi ∩ Q p = ∅, Qi ∩ Qc = ∅ and q /∈ Q p ∪ Qc ⇔ q ∈
Q1∪Q2. Hence, an equilibrium always exists, it is generally not unique since different
types of equilibria (up to three) may coexist for some parameter configurations; yet a
peaceful equilibrium and an confrontation equilibrium never coexist. unionsq
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